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As long ago as 1948, Mace (cited in Castaldi and Wortman, 1984), claimed that the advice of members of boards was effective in widening the perspectives of managers of smaller firms and that outside directors with complementary experience and backgrounds could be helpful in augmenting management’s business capabilities. Few would argue against establishing board structures, systems and processes that facilitate outcomes such as effective and efficient work practices, harmony in work relationships, compliance and effective risk management, and the pursuit of shared objectives and values. Effective governance structures and practices, including boards of directors, can contribute to these outcomes, particularly in the small to medium enterprise (SME) sector (Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Lorsch, 1995). 

In the Australian legal system, similar to that of the US, the UK, and other western systems, each incorporated entity such as a company, has a board of directors.  Under corporate law and the constitution of the company, the board of directors is accountable for the operation of the company; the powers and authority to make decisions and run the organisation is vested in that board.  The company’s constitution will typically allow the board to delegate its powers to senior employees, such a CEO.


All directors of companies (and indeed also not-for-profit incorporated entities) in Australia are essentially subject to the same general obligations under corporate law.  However, companies listed on the stock exchange are subject to further governance compliance, with additional regulations and public scrutiny by the media and the wider community.  Legally, a director of any Australian company (public, private or not-for-profit incorporated entity) is required to be 18 years or older, not insane, not a bankrupt, and to not have a criminal record.  Some moves are underway to place additional criteria for directorship in some companies – so-called ‘Fit and Proper Persons’ tests. 

It is becoming increasingly evident that many private companies, in striving to respond to a range of stakeholder interests and achieve success in a dynamic marketplace, will operate ‘almost’ as public companies and take on many of the more stringent protocols of corporate governance. Size, characteristics and structures of boards have been found to be important influences on the performance of large firms but the examination of their roles in SMEs has been less extensive and to date has not yielded such specific findings (Bennett & Robson, 2004).

While formal governance arrangements including the strategic planning, accountability, supervisory and monitoring responsibilities of boards of directors have received considerable attention in the research literature, informal governance mechanisms, including social interactions, family institutions, and shared visions, have received less attention (Mustakallio, Autio and Zahra, 2002: 219). These informal mechanisms are particularly important for family owned small to medium enterprises.

Family members often play both managing and governing roles in the family business which, if not properly undertaken, may contribute to some blurring of governance responsibilities and relationships (Tagiuri and Davis, 1996). The extent to which the family and the business require separate but linked governance structures will depend on the effectiveness with which the family members are able to communicate with the business’s governing body (ie the board). The family may consider it has adequate opportunity to communicate with the board both formally and informally through corporate and social forums. However, some businesses – often, but not always, those with larger family shareholder numbers – find a separate family forum an effective interface between the family and the business. 

Small to medium enterprises, most of which are family owned businesses, will benefit from effective governance practices and structures, particularly as they grow and as more family members become involved in the ownership and, in many cases, in the day to day management of the business. The unlisted family owned SME may choose to elect a board simply to comply with the law – in some cases, a single director board – however, those which elect a functioning board of directors may be rewarded with a smooth functioning company that excels in conformance and performance. A functioning board has the potential to facilitate the interests of both the ‘family’ and the ‘business’ ensuring that each is objectively considered and integrated into effective decision-making.

This paper reports on an exploratory study of why some Australian family owned (ie private) small to medium sized enterprises (SME) establish boards of directors and others do not, and if boards have been set up, whether the owners consider them to be valuable to their business. 

BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Family businesses are estimated to account for 80% of the number of worldwide business (Gersick et al, 1997). In Australia they are the largest employer group with about 3 million of the 5.5 million workforce, equating to over 50% of the private sector workforce (Smyrnios et al 1997). While there is no single agreed definition of a family business, there is broad agreement that a business owned and managed by a family unit or their descendents is a family business (Chua et al, 1999). Accordingly, these figures are an indication of the dominance of family owned businesses in world economies. As researchers become more attracted to undertaking empirical research in the family business arena, which has traditionally been perceived as being difficult to access (Litz, 1995), there is also an increasing interest in research about family business governance. Dyer (1986) highlighted the need for effective boards in family businesses and Ward (2001), deemed that the fundamental responsibility of successful ownership is effective governance. Hence, whether a family business is publicly listed or not, the complexities of the overlap between the family, ownership and the business inherent in the ‘family business’ entity, will be managed more effectively with a structured approach to governance issues, including the formation of a board of directors. 

Drawing on agency theory, it is suggested that for the SME sized family business, the board may have a more important role than for larger businesses due to the wider information gap often prevalent between the owner/manager and the business stakeholders (Johannisson & Huse, 2000). Also, the board can be particularly useful in facilitating generational transitions in the family business: a time when the distribution of power needs clarifying and problem solving for the different generational groups is emotionally charged (Dyer, 1986). 

An effective family business board is seen as one in which the advantages of family ownership can be balanced with the development of independent and professional governance practices:
“The (family business) board is elected by the shareholders and legally represents them in directing (the business). It typically comprises top management, family members, and, in the best cases, experienced business people from outside the company. Ideally, a board will have a majority of independent, outside directors and will elect its own chairperson.” (Ward, 1988, p8). 

Also according to Ward, for such boards to be effective in the family owned business, shareholders need to be prepared and educated for ownership roles and responsibilities. There is a need for mentoring and counselling those who may not have prior experience of governance issues, including the family member CEO, senior family and non-family management, family employees and other family shareholders not involved in the day to day management of the business (Ward, 2001). 

The concept that a board should ideally include independent non-family directors has received considerable support recently. For example, Johannisson and Huse (2000), argue that the family business will be better served by incorporating external (non-family) members as they will create awareness of a wider range of managerial issues than would the family-only board members. Johannisson and Huse (2000) take this further by exploring the challenges of the family owned SME to attract and select the ‘right’ outside appointee/s for the board. In their view the emotions and politics of the family business may cause some degree of irrationality which may adversely influence the nature of board member selection in these businesses. They surmised that traditional defensive family businesses might be hesitant to invite external members onto a board whereas genuinely entrepreneurial firms may consider access to governance competencies as just another resource to exploit when growth is aggressively promoted. The cases studied by Johannisson and Huse suggest that in practice the CEO, often a family member, made the final selection of independent directors and that decades of personal relations and ‘personal chemistry’ played an important role in the selection rather than the track record of the candidate. Berry and Perren (2001) support this practice in finding that the appointment of non-executive directors should be made through sources trusted by the owner/managers. In their survey of over 5000 UK SMEs, they also found that non-executive directors were more likely to be appointed when the firm reached 50 employees. 

Corbetta and Salvato (2004) take a contingency perspective and warn that boards in the family business will not lead to increased performance under all conditions because of the contingent situation created by family involvement. In their view:

 “Family firms that explicitly take the extent and the quality of such involvement into consideration will develop boards of directors through which they will reap rewards by improving its effectiveness in providing both control and accountability, and resources which are vital to the firm’s prospects for success and survival.” (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004, p6)

Texts and treaties about the roles of boards of directors and their contribution to the governance of organisations abound. In one such publication Hilmer and Tricker (1994) summarise the work of boards as having four components: formulating strategy, setting policies, supervising executive management and providing accountability. Figure 1 (Hilmer & Tricker, 1994, p 287) depicts these responsibilities across four dimensions, internal/external (to differentiate between a focus on internal operations and on the external influences from the environment in which the firm exists) and long term/short term. This arrangement also enables the board’s contribution to the company’s performance through strategy formulation and policy making to be grouped on the right hand side, and its responsibility to ensure conformance to required results and maintenance of accountability to the shareholders and other interested parties, to be grouped on the left hand side. While these dimensions have not been specifically developed for the SME sized business nor for the family owned business, they provide a useful framework for this study though which to explore how board functions are conceptualised in the family owned SME. 

Cutting across all four dimensions is the board’s responsibility for the selection of the chief executive and planning for his or her successor. The latter function is of particular interest in the family business which may or may not desire to have a family member in the position of chief executive. The challenges of appointing on merit, if this is the case, become complex.


External	AccountabilityReporting to shareholdersEnsuring statutes - regulatory complianceReviewing audit reports	Strategic thinkingReviewing and initiating strategic analysisFormulating strategySetting corporate direction
Internal	SupervisionReviewing key executive performanceReviewing business resultsMonitoring budgetary control and corrective actions	Corporate policyApproving budgetsDetermining compensation policy for senior executivesCreating corporate culture
	Short term	Long term
Figure 1: Range of Board Functions (Source: Adapted from Hilmer and Tricker, 1994)

Boards of directors of family businesses are governance bodies that will both monitor management on behalf of shareholders and provide various resources to the business. (Corbetta and Salvato, 2004). Other roles performed by boards include ensuring legal and ethical conduct by the business and its employees (Lorsch 1995, Conger et al. 1998), and bringing ideas and perspectives of people from within the business and from outside it to contribute to more effective and responsive decision-making (Gabrielsson & Winlund 2000). According to Gabrielsson and Winlund (2000, p314), “the main function of the board is considered to be its control role… (as it) is seen as a formal body for stakeholders or principals to control managerial behaviour”. The board’s involvement in the ratification and monitoring of decisions can make a significant difference to the development of the business. The board also acts as a service provider by giving valuable advice and networking opportunities for the management team through its accumulated knowledge and skills. These comments are directed at SMEs generally. However, in the family owned SME where management and ownership often overlap, the monitoring body should ideally include independent directors and the board’s service role can be invaluable in complementing scarce management resources.

In their research about boards in SMEs in the UK, Bennett and Robson (2004) highlight that the value provided by boards of directors in SMEs is difficult to identify and will depend on managerial needs and trading conditions often unique to each firm. They did not find any one board structure or system that could be offered as being more linked to better performance than another. 

Fiegener et al’s (2000) research about boards in small private firms in the USA proposed that CEOs of small private firms who have larger ownership stakes will tend to have smaller boards with more non-independent members in order to preserve their decision autonomy. While this proposition was generally supported by the research, they also found that in some cases, where there was more complex family/business overlap and greater potential for conflict between family and business needs, the CEO tended to expand the board numbers to accommodate greater family involvement in governance of the business. This was also the case when there was an imminent transition to the next generation of family management.





The study was necessarily qualitative as the focus was on why (or why not), family businesses established and maintained functioning boards of directors and, if so, how did this occur. A series of case studies were developed in which the emphasis was on the family business participant’s attitudes to board formation and their perception of the importance of board function in the business. The study was based on one-to-one interviews with family and non-family executive and non-executive directors in family businesses. Family directors - executive or non-executive - are referred to as non-independent directors, while non-family directors are referred to as independent directors. A semi-structured interview guide was prepared to ensure interviews were on the one hand consistent, and on the other were flexible enough to probe specific aspects in the different cases.

The objective of the study was to explore whether the chosen family businesses had active boards rather than non-functioning entities merely satisfying legal requirements. Each of the companies interviewed had a board, as per legal requirements, with that board having the power and authority to make decisions and run the company.  However, we wished to find out whether that board actually exercised those powers and decision-making capacities, and if so how this occurred, and if not, who undertook these functions in the company and how this occurred.  Further, if the governance roles were not undertaken by the board, we were interested to know whether the approach adopted by the company functioned adequately or not.

 The following research questions were explored through the one-to-one interviews:

1.	What are the current informal/formal board mechanisms in these family businesses? 
2	Where an active board of directors has been established, how is it structured?
a.	What stimulated its formation and how does it currently operate? 
b.	Is the board considered to add value to the performance of the business? 
c.	What are the barriers to effective board function?
3	Where a board is not actively functioning, why is this so and how are governance requirements met in the family business?





Data was collected through in-depth one-to-one interviews of ten family business directors across nine small to medium sized Australian family business cases (ie businesses with up to 200 employees) ranging from the first to the fifth generation of ownership and management (see Table 1). The sample was a convenience sample of family businesses within South Australia.  

While family business cannot be viewed as an homogenous sector, for the cases in this study the family ownership stake was almost 100% providing the potential for strong family influence in the governance and the management of the business. In each case, there were family members in management positions and, in all but two cases, there were two generations involved in the business.

The ten interviewees across the nine cases included nine family members: eight family member CEOs/MDs, all of whom were non-independent directors, one non-independent non-executive director, and one independent director/chairman. 

Table One: Profile of cases and interviewees
Case	Type of Business	Generation of ownership/Generations working in the business	Employee size (F/TE)	Interviewees
				Role	Family/ non-family	Functioning Board[*indicates non-ex director included in membership]
Andersons	Food and Beverage Production/Retailing	4 & 55	110	CEO 	F	Yes*
Boyds	Printing	2 & 33 & 4	140	CEO 	F	Yes
Carmodys	Retailing and Distribution	22 &3 	500	MD 	F	Yes*
Dawsons	Food Production and Retailing	3 & 44	120	CEO 	F	No
Howsons	Financial Services	22	170	MD 	F	Yes*
Kleemans	Sales and Distribution(white goods)	2 & 33 	45	CEO 	F	Yes*
Pauls	Food & Beverage Production/Retailing	3&43&4	50	Non- ExecDirector	F	Yes*
Smart	Media	11	4	MD 	F	Yes*
Smart	Media	11	4	Chairman 	NF	Yes*
Taylors	PR and Marketing	11 & 2	12	MD 	F	No


The following cameos outline the current board situation of the participating cases. Company names and details have been changed to protect confidentiality.

Andersons is a fifth generation family business owned by the fourth and fifth generations, and managed by a fifth generation cousin consortium. The board is active, includes non-executive directors from the family and from outside the family. The motivation for an active board stems from the third generation when the number of shareholders grew. The former fourth generation Chairman was instrumental in encouraging the board to include outside independent directors as he wanted some support for projects he thought would meet with resistance. Since then, independent directors have become an established part of the structured board which has non-independent directors nominated from four arms of the original founding family. The board includes non-independent executive and non-executive directors and independent directors with the non-independent directors being in the majority. The board is chaired by a non-independent director; it holds monthly meetings, focusing on reviewing sales results, marketing programs, employee issues, and bad debts. Any proposals for capital expenditure above $50,000 require board consideration, along with any ‘significant’ proposed financial commitments. 


Boyds is a fourth generation family business owned by a sibling partnership and managed by a third generation member, with fourth generation members working in the business. The board has only non-independent directors and is considered of nominal value to the business. It was constituted by the second generation owner who bequeathed the business to his five children. They are all still alive and attend board meetings, although in the view of the current CEO, none are very productive or have anything of value to add to board deliberations. The CEO would like to encourage these now elderly directors to nominate qualified and knowledgeable representatives so the board may make a worthwhile contribution to the family business operations.

Carmodys is a third generation family business owned and managed by a second generation sibling partnership with third generation members working in the business. There is an active board with independent directors and an independent chairman. The board was formed by the owner /founder when the business was in its early stages and has been run almost as if it were a public company from its inception, paying attention to corporate governance requirements ‘except for all the sub committees’ (Interview transcript). Board membership includes non-independent sibling managers and independent directors and an independent chairman. There are equal numbers of non-independent and independent directors at present. Recently, the board considered its balance and agreed that it lacked an IT focus and headhunted a female board member to also partially redress the male dominance. That appointment was not successful as the appointee took too long to appreciate the particular business and industry environment to be able to make a meaningful contribution to the board’s deliberations.

Dawsons, a fourth generation family business owned by a third generation former CEO and a sibling partnership, with the siblings managing the business. There is no active board as the third generation ‘Chairman’ fears loss of control with a formalised board and particularly doubts that any independent directors will understand their business sufficiently to make a contribution that would be worth the money it would cost to recruit ‘him’ (sic). He would rather meet around the kitchen table with his son and daughter. The sibling partnership is keen to establish a board in due course. In their view, they are able to undertake the monitoring and supervisory roles of the board but miss out on the strategic focus and discipline that might be offered by a board.

Howsons is a second generation family business owned by a sibling partnership and managed by one of the second generation owners. There is an active board with non-independent and independent directors and an independent chairman. While this board is ‘ideally’ constituted according to the literature, it has some significant communication issues to address. The non-independent non-executive directors consider that the non-independent executive director (and CEO) is choosing the board members to suit his needs and they are not happy about the recent recruitment of the ‘independent’ chairman who in their view is a personal appointee of the CEO and not suitably qualified for the position.

Kleemans is a third generation family business owned by one second generation director together with a third generation sibling partnership, and is managed by a third generation member. The board was formed by the third generation CEO when his sibling resigned from the business and took much business knowledge with him. To avoid similar gaps in experience and competency, the third generation CEO formed a board with an independent chairman and he commented that the arrangement was working very well: “Before we had a board we relied heavily on our external accountant to advise us to ‘comply with what we had to comply with’”.

Pauls is a fourth generation family business owned by a third generation cousin consortium, managed by joint MD’s from the third generation and including the fourth generation in the management team. There is a board with non-independent directors and an independent chairman. The board acts more like a management team. “Certainly it does deal with the basic requirements of compliance and review of financials but even that, to a degree, I believe is compromised. I think our attention to risk management, to the organisational structure, to personnel, is all compromised . . .” (Non-independent non-executive director interviewee transcript)

Smart, a first generation family business, is owned and managed by a controlling owner with a board having an independent chairman. The board was formed when legal advisors suggested that to comply with various corporate regulations, a committee be formed for this relatively new business. The owner founder chose to form a board with an independent chairman who had (a) previous corporate experience and (b) an enquiring mind.

Taylors is a second generation family business owned and managed by a controlling owner and employing a second generation family member. There is no active board. While the CEO is cognisant of the advantages of a board of directors, and considers directors could augment the range of expertise available to him in running the business, he is a sole owner/director so sees no immediate need.






From an analysis and evaluation of the interview transcripts, several themes emerged which portray the key challenges experienced in the family business cases:
Motivations for formally establishing an active board 
Perceived advantages in having a board
Perceived disadvantages in establishing a board
Board membership issues
Barriers to effective board operations


1	Motivations for Establishing Active Boards 

While the need for boards of directors to undertake responsibilities such as those articulated by Hilmer and Tricker (see Figure 1) was generally recognised and appreciated by interviewees, in this study several reasons for the board’s existence other than carrying out those functions were identified. Reasons included: to reassure shareholders and other stakeholders (e.g. future buyers) that the business was solid; to cope with a particular crisis (including external crises and internal issues relating to family dynamics); and to help alleviate risks associated with the business that come with succession considerations, particularly if that succession might involve a family member. 

2	Perceived Advantages of Boards

Once boards were established, there were several perceived advantages identified for the family business including forcing the owner-manager to take time out of the day-to-day operations, enabling family owners to take a bird’s-eye-view of the business, providing comfort or peace of mind for owner-managers that all aspects of the business are being actively addressed (“overcoming the nagging feeling that some things are being missed” Interviewee transcript), and facilitating better decisions because “more heads” are thinking about and discussing the business. Effective family business boards were also perceived as promoting a more professional relationship between family owner-managers and non-family management. A specific function was their delivery of objective appraisals of remuneration levels for family executives and thus avoiding another potential source of conflict between family members where relations may be already strained.

3	Perceived Disadvantages of Family Business Boards

Reasons given for not setting up boards, or expressed disadvantages in their operation included that they are costly in time and money, that they would create additional work, that family owner/managers (and simultaneously, non-independent directors) were fearful of being judged naïve or ignorant – either by the other directors or by shareholders, that family owner/managers feared of becoming bogged down in bureaucracy and losing the ability to respond quickly. 

Some expressed uncertainty about how to attract suitable (and willing) directors, were fearful of making a poor selection and not knowing what capabilities to look for or how to assess those capabilities. Fear was also expressed that independent directors might misuse sensitive company information.


Interviewees also expressed concern about difficulties in enforcing the accountability of its managers when they are closely related, such as an uncle who is a director needing to encourage his nephew to be more accountable as a manager in the family business.  It is thought that family dynamics might well contribute to some blurring of executive management vs board of director accountabilities which may prove to be particular to the family owned business.


4	Issues of Board Membership 

All interviewees supported the inclusion of independent directors to ensure an external perspective is brought into the family business. However, these family business cases also commented on other roles of such appointees, which were necessitated because of the ‘familiness’ of the business. Independent directors were seen to be effective in minimising tensions between family members, as in the family business many family members were appointed directors almost solely because of their (or their close relatives’) shareholding and they often lacked the qualifications needed to be effective as directors.

Independent directors were also advantageous in filling gaps in expertise and to encourage other board members to push the boundaries. However, they were often recruited because the family knew them, trusted them and could therefore agree upon the appointment. In no case was a rigorous, objective selection process articulated. Most often the appointees had been known to the family members for some time and they were comfortable with them as people and with their apparent potential to add to the board’s expertise. Not having objective selection processes in place for the selection of directors from the beginning may be a weakness for family businesses, which leads them into stalemates over decisions on suitable board members and fuels any existing mistrust between family board members, in particular.
	
It was agreed in each case that independent directors, particularly those from outside the industry, add value by asking questions and forcing reflection on what might normally be taken for granted. However, several interviewees suggested that care should be taken in recruitment to ensure that appointees from outside the industry would not take too much time to ‘come up to speed’ with the needs of the family business and the industry in which it operates. 

5	Barriers to Effective Family Business Board Operations

Boards in family businesses are sometimes set up for the wrong reasons, such as to provide representation for family groups or to fix management problems. In other situations, the role of a board is not respected and is viewed by some as an expense the company could do without.

While most family businesses prefer to structure their boards to give appropriate recognition to branches of the family, they need to fill those branch appointee board positions with appropriately qualified directors. Such appointees may be family or non family – and therefore non-independent or independent – however, they should be equipped to make a contribution to the governance of the business. Bringing to the board the differing views and opinions from various branches of the family contributes to healthy debate.  However, it is important that decisions are ultimately made in the best interests of the family business as a whole. 

Family-only boards sometimes have operated for many years without paying attention to skill requirements with the result that those boards have acted more as management boards, mediating between family managers in the business. When an independent chairman is appointed to redress such a situation, much is expected of him or her to mediate between non-independent directors from different branches of the family, who do not necessarily have high levels of trust between them. Such mediation is often beyond the scope of an independent chairman’s role and will detract from effective board deliberations.





Overall, those businesses without functioning boards (two cases) or those with ineffective boards (three cases) could not be deemed to be satisfying the strategic role of governance nor adequately ensuring that the management team was monitoring the compliance of the company with laws and regulations. Two boards delegated decisions to the CEO/MD for employee matters, and appear to have, in effect, delegated much of their powers to the CEO/MD to run the business on a day-to-day basis. In such cases the governance responsibilities of the board cannot be assessed as being adequately discharged. These boards did not monitor general success measures (other than financial results). The boards had set little in the way of formal board policy, and have generally limited their monitoring role to that of financial results. Another board was acting as a defacto management committee and has had made little inroad to strategic issues; in this case setting up the so-called ‘board’ was no doubt well intentioned but the internal management structure and dynamics were not suitable to support an appropriately functioning board of directors. 

In the less effective boards, compliance monitoring was not a focus of the board – instead there was reliance on external professional advisers (accounting, legal, OH&S) to ensure the companies operated appropriately in these areas – and was otherwise dealt with by management. Strategic planning for these firms was done in broad terms at the level of the management teams, involving the CEO/MDs. There was a lack of formal board policy, but the CEO/MDs interviewed did not see this as a problem in the running of the businesses. These boards, as they operated, were not seen as covering the true governance roles other than financial oversight and considering specific expenditure proposals. 

In the remaining four cases the functioning boards were perceived as being of value and each CEO/MD stated that they would indeed keep the boards going if they were given the choice. In three of these cases, there was a perceived lack of expertise (one in IT, one financial and one legal) which the CEO/MDs wanted to redress. However each of these boards were perceived as valuable in challenging executive management to think about their issues and decisions, and being good at identifying and asking unexpected questions. From time to time the boards had helped a great deal in deciding what to do on the bigger issues, including where these have related to family issues. In short, these boards have been functioning in each of the governance roles: setting direction, making policy and overseeing performance, with much of the decision-making and implementation appropriately having been delegated to the CEO/MDs and executive team.

From the Hilmer and Tricker (1994) model of board roles, it could be argued that boards usually commence by identifying the key stakeholders of the organization, and where relevant, their relative order of importance. Having done that, the board’s job is then to be clear about what these stakeholders define as success of the organization – how it is measured; what are the various aspects; which are the more important. In these family business cases, it was clear that family stakeholders were seen to be pivotal in the board’s interactions, not always for the right reasons. The stated motivation for setting up boards revolved around family dynamics or the potential for dysfunctionality in some cases. Membership comments focused on both the need to include a range of family appointees or the need to get non-family appointees to counteract the family dominance.

In this study there was less evidence of the board’s role in setting standards and implementing strategies.  Family business boards might do well to pay more attention to creating a framework for the management of the organization to undertake such roles, providing guidance and constraints on management. This would ensure an effective policy framework which would help clarify the relationship between board and management, which so often overlap in the family business. The family business boards would then periodically assess the progress of management against these plans and strategies, to identify where interventions (but not interference) need to occur, to best deliver the desired results. 





Overall, from this study, it appears that family owned SMEs that have set up functioning boards with appropriate board practices, appointed appropriate independent directors, and have been serious about making the board function as a board, have found that those boards make a valuable contribution to the business. The experiences of these family businesses do not however suggest any one best way to constitute the board; various models have been shown to work, depending on the context. Setting up a board for the wrong reasons and without directors who are qualified to act as such, has generally led to unsatisfactory results.
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